El artículo examina la presencia de Friedrich Nietzsche a finales del siglo XX en Colombia, especialmente el periodo 1990-2010, a partir de varios presupuestos de la Historia social de la filosofía (HSF) y del enfoque genealógico planteado por el filósofo alemán. Para dar cuenta del anterior objetivo se establecen tres momentos. En el primer apartado I. Nietzsche y la Historia social de la filosofía, se analizan varios presupuestos de la HSF a partir de los cuales se señalan aspectos característicos del (...) periodo 1990-2010. En el segundo apartado II. Edgar Garavito y la filosofía del transcurso, se destaca el trabajo del filósofo colombiano Edgar Garavito, en especial su obra La transcursividad. Crítica de la identidad psicológica como un vector fundamental de la clave interpretativa “postestructuralista” de Nietzsche. Finalmente, en el tercer apartado III. Otros devenires de Nietzsche, se destacan algunos trabajos de Jaime Toro y Víctor Florián, filósofos colombianos que han hecho tanto lecturas como usos otros del pensador alemán. (shrink)

This article analyzes the technology of memory as truth, based on the work carried out by the Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition, created in Colombia within the framework of the Peace Agreements signed by the government and the FARC-EP guerrillas in 2016, utilizing the confessional dispositif proposed by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s. The study of confession and testimony is developed in three stages: 1. The mechanism for collecting testimonies in the volume Cuando los (...) pájaros no cantaban will be analyzed. 2. The studies on confession and truth in Foucault's analyses will be revisited. 3. An articulation between memory and history based on testimonies is proposed. The article concludes with references to historical memory from the proposal of a testimonial technology, proposed from the confessional dispositif. (shrink)

Tras la llegada de los conquistadores españoles y durante los dos siglos del reinado de su monopolio, no se permitió el ingreso de extranjeros y la población permaneció distribuida en las regiones, en proporciones casi inversas a las actuales. Con la caída del régimen español y los avances del monopolio inglés, comenzó a desplazarse el centro territorial argentino desde el Noroeste hacia el Litoral y a producirse variaciones en la dinámica demográfica. El establecimiento del modelo agroexportador produjo una afluencia excepcional (...) de inmigrantes de ultramar, que generaron cambios vertiginosos en la estructura de la población. Asimismo, el fin del modelo agroexportador que provocó la abrupta interrupción del flujo inmigratorio de ultramar, generó nuevamente otro intenso cambio demográfico que incidió en la estructura poblacional hasta la actualidad. Este artículo se centra en el movimiento migratorio que produjo el modelo agroexportador, con el objetivo de analizar sus efectos en el ritmo de crecimiento de la población, en la distribución de las variables demográficas básicas —sexo y edad—, y en los cambios en la distribución espacial, siendo su fuente principal los censos nacionales de población realizados hasta la actualidad. (shrink)

El presente trabajo es un análisis sobre la manera en que el concepto de «exploración espacial» contiene ciertos aspectos falaces respecto a la verdadera exploración espacial, puesto que se ha construido a partir de textos de diversos lenguajes estéticos de la tradicionalmente denominada «cultura popular». Estos textos han jugado con un imaginario que remite a cierto romanticismo espacial y a una obsesión con un Otro inquietante o modélico, según el caso, así como con lo sublime desprendido del llamado «vértigo cósmico». (...) Todo ello se aglutina bajo el tópico «sentido de la maravilla». (shrink)

Queda mucho por estudiar en la academia española sobre el funcionamiento de la estética transmedial. En algunos ámbitos académicos la «cultura popular» sufre aún del estigma «lo no merecedor de estudio». Por otra parte, su complejidad y el gran número de obras de esta estética hace muy difícil su estudio en conjunto. Una de las maneras más interesantes para acercarse es tomar una base temática fuerte mediante la cual establecer ciertas líneas que enriquezcan su lectura y den cuenta de su (...) relación con la sociedad. Como muestra de acercamiento fractal a la estética transmedial, se propone el estudio del universo transmedial de Star Wars desde el concepto del Mal. En este sentido, se proponen unos primeros ejemplos tomados de diferentes lenguajes para extraer a partir de ellos una muestra de la manera en que Star Wars representa el concepto del Mal y de qué ideologías parte para ello. (shrink)

The formalization of abductive reasoning has received increasing attention from logicians. However, few work is found beyond abduction in propositional logic, given that in a first order formalism, the undecidability problem naturally appears, and therefore an abductive problem cannot even be appropriately formulated. Still, many applications in artificial intelligence allow finite domains to work with, and this gives an opportunity to apply abduction in first order logic with restricted domains. In this paper, we present an approach to abductive reasoning in (...) C-structures, first order structures with a finite domain in which each of its elements has a corresponding constant representing its interpretation. By using semantic tableaux with bounded depth, that is, C-tableaux (a modification of N-tableaux, introduced by the authors in previous papers) and δ-resolution calculus, we build an effective procedure for the searching of minimal abductive solutions within the proposed semantics. (shrink)

_BMC Medical Ethics_ is an open access journal publishing original peer-reviewed research articles in relation to the ethical aspects of biomedical research and clinical practice, including professional choices and conduct, medical technologies, healthcare systems and health policies. _BMC __Medical Ethics _is part of the _BMC_ series which publishes subject-specific journals focused on the needs of individual research communities across all areas of biology and medicine. We do not make editorial decisions on the basis of the interest of a study or (...) its likely impact. Studies must be scientifically valid; for research articles this includes a scientifically sound research question, the use of suitable methods and analysis, and following community-agreed standards relevant to the research field. Specific criteria for other article types can be found in the submission guidelines. _BMC series - open, inclusive and trusted_. (shrink)

Considering the transformation of educational scenarios, we recognize the need to train foreign language teachers with high pedagogical, research, and technological skills. This recognition considers the new challenges of education and aligns with the educational discourses and commitments that are shaped by the curricular proposals of foreign language programs in higher education. It is necessary to know the level of competencies of teacher trainers, university lecturers, to identify possible ongoing training needs. This research uses a mixed-methods design with an exploratory-descriptive (...) approach that contributes to the educational instructions to start continuous training plans for their teachers under the policies, global dynamics, and demands of education. The research shows that there are still challenges to confront, as teachers still have opportunities to strengthen their pedagogical, educational, and new technology competencies. This is a challenge that institutions should address in the rigorous implementation of lifelong learning programs. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

Over the past two decades the growth of the organic sector has been accompanied by a shift away from first party, or peer review, systems of certification and towards third party certification, in which a disinterested party is responsible for the development of organic standards and the verification of producer compliance. This paper explores some of the limitations of the third party certification model and presents the case of Mexico as an example of how an alternative form of participatory certification (...) has emerged. The paper suggests that participatory guarantee systems (PGS) are reflective of the growing “beyond organic” movement, which focuses on reconstructing the local and re-embedding food systems into their socio-ecological contexts. It argues that PGS offers a number of benefits for producers and consumers, particularly in the South, but that it faces a number of challenges as well, such as a lack of formal recognition, social conflicts and dependence on donated resources. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, Cuba has become a recognized global leader in sustainable agriculture. This paper explores how this process of agricultural transition has taken place, and argues that it has largely been led by research institutes, non-state organizations and the Cuban government, which have all contributed to the institutionalization of agroecology in both policy and practice. This process has been highly effective in terms of the numbers of people using agroecological techniques. However, although these techniques have been widely (...) adopted by farmers across the country, this paper suggests that many still perceive maximizing production to be a higher priority than maintaining a commitment to agroecological ideals. For these farmers, agroecological farming is viewed primarily as a pragmatic decision rather than an ideological or moral one, and they may thus be susceptible to shifting back to conventional production if this option became politically and economically feasible. (shrink)

We present a framework for understanding abduction within modal logic and Kripke semantics; worlds of a Kripke frame will represent possible theories, and a change in theory will be understood as a passage from one world to an adjacent possible world. Further, these steps may agree with the accessibility relation or may ‘backtrack’, accordingly as new information refutes or reinforces our present theory. Our formalism can be used to model not only abduction, but also to talk about the inner structure (...) of theories as well as relations between them, allowing us to interpret many ideas from philosophy of science within the well-understood framework of modal logic. (shrink)

IntroductionThis study aimed to evaluate, in adults with mild cognitive impairment, the brain atrophy that may distinguish between three AT biomarker-based profiles, and to determine its clinical value.MethodsStructural MRI was employed to evaluate the volume and cortical thickness differences in MCI patients with different AT profiles, namely, A−T−−: normal AD biomarkers; A+T−−: AD pathologic change; and A+T++: prodromal AD. Sensitivity and specificity of these changes were also estimated.ResultsAn initial atrophy in medial temporal lobe areas was found in the A+T−− and (...) A+T++ groups, spreading toward the parietal and frontal regions in A+T++ patients. These structural changes allowed distinguishing AT profiles within the AD continuum; however, the profiles and their pattern of neurodegeneration were unsuccessful to determine the current clinical status.ConclusionsMRI is useful in the determination of the specific brain structural changes of AT profiles along the AD continuum, allowing differentiation between MCI adults with or without pathological AD biomarkers. (shrink)

The author argues that the individual and group life of Leonard Nelson and his followers constitute a case of philosophy as a way of life in the sense described by Pierre Hadot. Philosophy as a theoretical activity was for Nelson not enough; it had to have a practical effect. Insofar as a philosopher first tries to live according to his philosophy, and in that process looks for a transformation of his own life, we can say that this is (...) a proper case of philosophy as a way of life. How did Nelson's philosophy as a way of life look in more detail? An inspection of the available facts shows that several of the external signs of a philosophical life in antiquity reemerge in the Nelsonian movement. This is the second part of the author's argument that philosophy in Nelson's sense — what he and all his followers called ‘critical philosophy’. (shrink)

This papers presents δ-resolution, a dual resolution calculus. It is based on standard resolution, and used appropriate formulae equivalent to disjunctive normal forms, instead of conjunctive normal ones, as it is the case for resolution. This duality is then useful to create a calculus for abductive process, as a way to construct a set of abductive solutions. The proposed calculus is compared to semantic tableaux, an standard logical framework, aslo illuminating when studying abduction.δ-resolution calculus is a contribution to logic programming, (...) and it further suggests new possibilities to explore abduction at a first order level, in the lines of those proposed in [9]. (shrink)

This book compiles 17 short pieces in which the renowned Spanish philosopher and intellectual Fernando Savater (San Sebastián, 1947) evokes the thought and character of George Santayana. The selection spans over more than 30 years – the earliest text was originally published in 1977 and the last one dates from 2010 –, revealing Savater’s sustained interest in, and fondness for the figure of Santayana. Completing the collection of self-contained texts there are two more sections: one of fragme...

The COVID-19 pandemic marked a before and after for the global economy, and one of the most affected sectors was the health sector, where rising costs in medical care, protective equipment and infrastructure, coupled with a decrease in income from other regular services, led a large part of health centers such as public and private hospitals to resort to unethical accounting practices for the manipulation of their financial information (creative accounting). These events of financial depression and relaxation of controls during (...) the health emergency allowed the creation of a "favorable" environment to distort financial statements through techniques such as premature recording of income, undervaluation of expenses, among others, to evade taxes and take advantage of the benefits imposed by governments to promote humanitarian aid and prioritize health care. The purpose of this article is to highlight the most common creative accounting practices that were applied in the health sector in Latin America during the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent effects it had on the economy and on the governmental control of the countries in the region for the detection of these practices. (shrink)

On 22 July, 2011, we were confronted with the horror of the actions of Anders Behring Breivik. The instant reaction, as we have seen with similar incidents in the past—such as the Oklahoma City bombings—was to attempt to explain the incident. Whether the reasons given were true or not were irrelevant: the fact that there was a reason was better than if there were none. We should not dismiss those that continue to cling on to the initial claims of a (...) wider Jihadist plot behind the actions of Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols as Islamophobes (or merely lacking common sense): for, it is often easier to rely on reason—no matter how fictional—than not to have anything to cling on at all. In many ways, it is even better if the reason is fictional: for, if grounded in a certain fact, or reality, it can then go away. However, if it is in the realm of the imaginary, it is then always already metaphorical: thus, can be applied to any and every situation. And it is this, if we echo Friedrich Nietzsche, that gives us our “metaphysical comfort”; that we can know what is going on. This is why conspiracy theories are so popular: underlying them is the logic that someone—no matter how implausible—is in control of the situation. One would rather believe that all acts of terror stemmed from Osama bin Laden (and the narrative worked even better when he was in a ‘cave in Afghanistan’) than if they were the actions, and decisions, of singular individuals. For, if there is a head organizing everything, it can be cut off; there is no controlling a mass of singularities. As Jean Baudrillard continues to teach us, the term ‘mass’ is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky, lumpen-analytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with ‘more subtle’ categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status, etc. This is wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions (like ‘mana’ once was) that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology. Besides, it will be noticed retrospectively that the concepts ‘class’, ‘social relations’, ‘power’, ‘status’, ‘institution’, and ‘social’ itself—all these too-explicit concepts which are the glory of the legitimate sciences—but also only ever been muddled notions themselves, but notions upon which agreement has nevertheless been reached for mysterious ends: those of preserving a certain code of analysis. To want to specify the term ‘mass’ is a mistake—it is to provide meaning for that which has none.1 And it is this lack of meaning—this nothingness of not only the mass, but our inability to know in general—that truly scares us. For, if we are never able to legitimately make a generalizing statement, this suggests that we can never actually posit beyond a singular, situational, moment. Hence, we can never claim to know anyone: at best, we can only catch momentary glimpses. It is for this very reason that the insanity plea Breivik’s lawyer will attempt is the one that horrifies us the most. For, if Breivik is insane, this foregrounds our inability to understand, know. And as Aristotle has taught us, it is more important that something is plausible than if something were probable—in this context, we would rather have Breivik as a calculating mass murderer than someone who was completely out of his mind. This is especially ironic in the light of the fact that none of us would say that we have any similarity with Breivik. If that were so, the declaration that he was mad should be no more than a logical consequence. However, we also want Breivik to be accountable for his actions. And in order for that to be so, we need him to be of sound mind. But if that were true, we can then no longer distinguish ourselves from him. And it is precisely this that scares us. For, we are horrified not when there are abnormalities to our way of life. There are usually two different reactions to this—either oppose and destroy it; or subsume it under the dominant logic. We see this most clearly in reactions to immigration: there are either calls for immigrants to ‘pack up and leave’ or pseudo-liberal notions of ‘we are all alike’. Both of which are merely version of “all men are brothers”—the brutal translation of which is that you are my brother if you live the same way as me; otherwise not only are you not my brother, you are also potentially not part of mankind (you might as well be, to echo Giorgio Agamben, bare life ). This is played out in our age of what is commonly termed post-political bio-politics —an instance of horribly awkward theoretical jargon that Slavoj Žižek channeling Agamben unpacks rather elegantly: “ post-politics is a politics which claims to leave behind old ideological struggles and, instead, focus[es] on expert management and administration, while bio-politics designates the regulation of the security and welfare of human lives as its primary goal.”2 Žižek continues: Post-political bio-politics also has two aspects which cannot but appear to belong to two opposite ideological spaces: that of the reduction of humans to ‘bare life,’ to Homo sacer , that so-called sacred being who is the object of expert caretaking knowledge, but is excluded, like prisoners at Guantanamo or Holocaust victims, from all rights; and that of respect for the vulnerable Other brought to an extreme through an attitude of narcissistic subjectivity which experiences the self as vulnerable, constantly exposed to a multitude of potential harassments [….] What these two poles share is precisely the underlying refusal of any higher causes, the notion that the ultimate goal of our lives is life itself. That is why there is no contradiction between the respect for the vulnerable Other and […] the extreme expression of treating individuals as Homini sacer .3 This is why the ones that are harshest towards new immigrants are the recently naturalized citizens of any country. For, if there is no longer any “ideological struggle” and all life is reduced to mere automaton-living, there is the realization that we are all the same—not in a tree-hugging hippie sense—but that the immigrant is the same as us precisely because we are all immigrants. And since all nations, and by extension peoples in a nation (especially those who believe in the notion of nationality, and national identity), have to find some manner, no matter from where or what it is, to distinguish themselves from those around them, the other (in spite, and especially in the light, of its absence) is the most crucial aspect of the discourse of nationality. More precisely, in the interests of what Baudrillard calls “preserving a certain code of analysis” (nationality in this case), what has to be maintained is the absolute otherness of the other. Very rarely is Boris Johnson right: “it is not enough to say he is mad. Anders Breivik is patently mad.”4 However, much like Breivik in his manifesto, he should have stopped whilst he was ahead. By attempting to diagnose Breivik—“the fundamental reasons for their callous behavior lie deep in their own sense of rejection and alienation. It is the ideology that gives them the ostensible cause … that gives them an excuse to dramatize the resentment … and to kill.”—Johnson falls into the same trap that he accuses others of: “to try to advance any other explanation for their actions … is simply to play their self-important game.” More crucially, and this is the point that Johnson completely misses, attempting to rationalize Breivik’s actions—to rehabilitate reason—is a desperate attempt at maintaining his otherness. In fact, we’ll end up going one step further, insist on Breivik’s sanity, put him on the stand, and hope that he will display such a difference from all of us that we can rest safe that we are unlike him and his kind. That, in itself, is a dangerous game to play. One should not forget that the turning point in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein is in the central part of her novel where she lets the monster speak. At that moment, the monster moves from an ‘it’ to a fully subjectivized person; with his own stories, historicities, emotions, and so on. In Slavoj Žižek’s reading of Frankenstein , this is the moment where “the ultimate criminal is thus allowed to present himself as the ultimate victim. The monstrous murderer reveals himself to be a deeply hurt and desperate individual, yearning for company and love.”5 But, in the case of Breivik, this goes beyond just a risk of us feeling for him: for, no right-minded person should ever deny another the opportunity to put forth her or his own case. The problem lies with us trying to deny the madness of Breivik’s act by putting him back under reason. The problem is in our inability to differentiate the act from the person; the singular from the universal.6 In our desperation to preserve the notion that we are rational beings incapable of becoming monsters, we’ve had to deny the meaninglessness—in the strict sense of it lying outside of reason—of Breivik’ act; we’ve had to “provide meaning where there is none.” For, if this act were a moment of madness—a moment that comes from elsewhere—we cannot say that it will not descend upon us one day. If Breivik’s actions were that of a sane person, one who is in control of his being, his self, we can then locate the otherness in his being. More importantly, this would allow us to distinguish ourselves from that said being. Breivik’s sanity is the only thing that allows us to say that ‘this act of terror is borne out of one with an ultra-right ideology’; and ‘since I am not of that ideology, I would never do such a thing’. By doing that, we attempt to protect ourselves by claiming that people who share Breivik’s ideology are foreign to us, other to us. However, if Breivik’s act was a moment of insanity, his otherness is no longer locatable: and the notion of ‘us and them’ shifts from a geographical, physical, religious, or cultural notion, to one in the realm of ideas. And this is what truly scares us. For, if what is foreign is not phenomenological, then it cannot be seen, detected, sensed. Anders Behring Breivik, Timothy McVeigh, and Terry Nichols, terrify us not merely for the fact that they were white in a white society, but more pertinently that their skin color did not matter: we would not be able to spot them even if they were blue, even if they were right next to us, even if we had known them all our lives. Even as we are grappling with holding Breivik accountable by declaring him of sound mind, what truly terrifies us is that deep down we know that Breivik’s act is a moment of madness; beyond all comprehensibility. And this means that we would not be able to spot the idea; even if it were in our heads at this very moment. We have gone to lengths to rehabilitate Breivik, McVeigh, Nichols, and such perpetrators of massive incomprehensible violence, in order to preserve our difference from them. What we have really been trying to deny is the fact that everyone, at any given moment, could have a moment of madness. And this is the true radicality of Mary Shelley: in allowing us to momentarily enter the head of the monster, she shows us not just the fact that he is like any one of us, but that any one of us could, in the right (or wrong) circumstance, be like him. Perhaps here, there is a lesson to be learned from Wes Craven’s A Nightmare on Elm Street . The most dangerous thing that one could do on Elm Street was to mention Freddy’s name—once you had knowledge of him, you were open to the possibility of a visit during your dreams. This suggests that Freddy is a combination of externalities (after all, when you die, he survives) and your self (if you have never heard of him, he cannot come for you). In this sense, Freddy would be the manifestation par excellence of what Avital Ronell calls a “killer text”—it is one’s relationality with the text (and the ideas, notions, in the said text) that opens oneself to it, to the lessons of the text, to being changed, affected, even to the dangers of the text. After all, one should never forget Plato’s warning that ideas can corrupt, can be perilous. To compound matters, as Ronell reminds us, “the connection to the other is a reading—not an interpretation, assimilation, or even a hermeneutic understanding, but a reading.”7 Thus, in attempting to differentiate ourselves from Breivik by concocting some reason(s) why we are not like him, we have done nothing but read him, open a connection to him. *** Bang bang, he shot me down Bang bang, I hit the ground Bang bang, that awful sound Bang bang, my baby shot me down. “Bang Bang (My Baby Shot Me Down)” Sonny Bono, 1966. This is the part that we all know and remember. Whilst never quite remembering that this is a song that is not so much about violence, love, but about remembering. For, after the bridge comes the accusatory stanza: “Now he's gone, I don't know why/ And till this day, sometimes I cry/ He didn't even say goodbye/ He didn't take the time to lie.” Bang Bang is a game that the two lovers used to play; and all she has now is the memory of the game to remember him by. And the only reason she has to recall this game is: he never provided her a reason for his leaving, his death. Not that she will, can, ever get that satisfactory answer. This is precisely the game we are playing with Anders Behring Breivik. Even though he has left a 1500 page manifesto, even though we will allow him to use the court-room as his platform, we will continue screaming at him “tell me why …” For, what we want him to say is that we are not like him: what we really want him to do is, “take the time to lie …” Perhaps here, we should allow the echo of the infans to resound in baby . As Christopher Fynsk reminds us, the infans is one that is pre-language, pre-knowing, pre-understanding: it is the very finitude, and exteriority, of relationality itself.8 And thus, it is a position of openness to the fullness of possibility—and nothing else. This would be, in Ronell’s terms, a “connection to the other” that knows nothing other than the fact that it is a connection. The true horror of 22 July, 2011, is the fact that it is not Anders Behring Breivik who is mad, but the act itself that is. And this is precisely why only “my baby” that could have “shot me down.” For, it is an act that is from beyond, a sheer act of madness that—as Plato warns us—is whispered into our ears (and can so easily be mistaken for inspiration, and even wisdom), an act that can both seize, and cease, us at the same time. And what can this utter openness to an other, the other, be but a moment of love, a true ‘falling in love’. At the moment of whispering, nothing can be known as we are babies as our baby shoots us down …. Hence, all attempts at analyzing this event (including this one) are not only futile, but border on the farcical. The real tragedy is that we forget that all of us have the possibility of becoming Breivik. NOTES Jean Baudrillard. In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . Trans. Paul Foss, John Johnston, Paul Patton, & Andrew Berardini. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. p. 37. Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p. 34 Ibid: 35-36. Boris Johnson. “ Anders Breivik: There is nothing to study in the mind of Norway’s mass killer .” The Telegraph . (25 July, 2011): Slavoj Žižek. Violence: Six Sideway Reflections . London: Profile Books, 2009. p.39. What is killing us is the notion that Breivik’s act is beyond reason, beyond knowing, outside understanding itself. This is why Boris Johnson’s plea was for us to ignore Breivik as a madman. But to do so, Johnson conflates the notion of the act and the person; the singular and the universal. This is exactly the same gesture as insisting on his sanity: the ‘madman’ is merely the absolute other, one that we are not. Avital Ronell. The Telephone Book: Technology, Schizophrenia, Electric Speech . Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989: 380. Christopher Fynsk. Infant Figures: The Death of the Infans and Other Scenes of Origin . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.  . (shrink)

Edward Nelson published in 1986 a book defending an extreme formalist view of mathematics according to which there is an impassable barrier in the totality of exponentiation. On the positive side, Nelson embarks on a program of investigating how much mathematics can be interpreted in Raphael Robinson's theory of arithmetic Q. In the shadow of this program, some very nice logical investigations and results were produced by a number of people, not only regarding what can be interpreted in (...) Q but also what cannot be so interpreted. We explain some of these results and rely on them to discuss Nelson's position. (shrink)